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Administrative theory has always been polarised between a branch of political science and managerial or organisation studies. Theories of bureaucracy occupy a middle ground between these two ways of studying the public service. While political concepts and organisational concepts attempt sometimes to adopt an objective standpoint, both viewpoints lend themselves to normative arguments and propositions. Political science is concerned particularly with the relationships between politicians and bureaucrats, and with how bureaucrats interpret, implement, modify or distort political directives. Managerial theory offers prescriptions for administrative efficiency and effectiveness which are variously and sometimes weakly related to the political framework within which they must operate.
This article first explores three periods in the development of administrative theories during this century, followed by a critique of currently dominant theories and a short look at some emerging developments. Throughout the emphasis is on two issues; political-bureaucratic relationship and associated concepts of administrative organisation.
Three Periods of Theory
The first period started well before 1900 (in Britain it can be traced back to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1856) and lasted up to the second world war. In this period a sharp distinction was drawn between political and bureaucratic roles and functions, expressed at the extreme limit by Woodrow Wilson's contention that administration constituted an independent domain of sound 'scientific' practice which would be equally relevant and responsible to any form of political leadership.
However, despite Wilson's words, the relationship during this period did not develop as simply one of political direction and administrative compliance. Instead a kind of bargain was struck between political and bureaucratic roles whereby each participant had a distinctive realm of competence and authority. Political leaders (Ministers) had the right to make policies and would take the praise or blame for their consequences. Bureaucrats would stay anonymous, shielded from blame or praise. This formula was to some extent a distinctive Whitehall concept and was less true of some European countries where leading bureaucrats could express their opinions rather more openly. However it did capture one aspect of the relationship which seemed to work to the satisfaction of both participants.
Conversely bureaucracy developed during this period a marked degree of internal autonomy or self-management. Under the aegis of the 'merit principle', recruitment and promotion within the public service were largely or wholly controlled by senior bureaucrats themselves backed up by security of tenure and (in some countries) systematic career planning. Politically independent public service commissions or boards acted as watchdogs for the merit principle. Qualifications for officials were based initially upon academic or professional credentials and later upon their superiors' views of what constituted a reliable and efficient public service.
The rationale of this system was of course to insulate public administration from political favouritism or intervention and thereby to ensure that laws or public policies were applied impartially and effectively by properly qualified individuals who had (or were assumed to have) no personal stake in the outcome. Another effect of the system, however, was to strengthen the power base of the senior bureaucrats who controlled an increasingly large and diversified administrative machine. As the functions of govemment grew, questions began to be asked as to whether bureaucratic control over communications and resources might be used to delay or modify unpalatable political directives or to distort representation from a widening number of concerned interest groups. These issues came to the fore in the next historical period.
In this first period the concepts of 'scientific administration' emerged gradually as the dominant paradigm of efficient administration. These theories recommended the use of rational and orderly procedures summarised in the acronym PODSCORB (planning, organising, directing, co-ordinating, reporting, budgeting) and the maintenance of a disciplined hierarchy which owed quite a lot to military and Fordist industrial analogies. Because much public administration, at the beginning of this period, still had some of the amateur features of patrimonial fiefs, scientific administration offered an adequate basis for introducing more systematic procedures. Its biggest theoretical problem was maintaining the concept of 'unity of command' in the face of increasing specialisation of functions and skills. Its biggest triumph was the 1937 report of President F.D. Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Management which used unity of command to argue successfully that the President should be armed with adequate staff services to implement his role as chief executive (Gulick and Urwick, 1937) -a view which conflicted with an alternative constitutional interpretation of the American separation of powers, which saw Federal bureaux as working under the triple supervision of President, Congress and the Judiciary (Millett, 1966) .
The second period (1945-75) is the one in which I feel personally most at home because it covers most of my years as a teacher of public administration.
Moreover I would argue that it was an exceptionally rich period in administrative theorising. It marked a break with the more simplified and monolithic concepts of the first period by recognising the diversity and pluralism of administrative behaviour. In particular it brought in administrative politics -bureaucrats as having specific interests, goals and tactics -to replace the earlier concept of administration as an insulated, routinised machine.
In this pluralist era the stress was on group identities, cultures, aims and conflicts within bureaucracy as well as between bureaucrats and politicians. Both administrative departments and agencies as well as distinctive administrative cadres were seen as protagonists or allies in these encounters. The culture and influence of the British administrative class and the power and rivalries of the French grands corps were placed under the microscope. The results were often highly critical -as in Lord Balogh's description of the British administrative tradition as the 'apotheosis of the dilettante'. British economic decline was blamed upon its administrators' lack of relevant training and specialisation and their frequent rotation between offices. The French administrative elite, perhaps because their country was more economically successful, fared better. The characteristics of European administrative elites were mapped (Armstrong, 1973) . In the USA, however, there was no dominant administrative group and the senior executive service, when it appeared, was a loose grouping of officials of similar rank, not a cohesive cadre with a distinctive background and traditions. Consequently administrative politics was seen as revolving around the relations of Federal bureaux, supervising agencies, Congressional committees and interest groups.
Theories of political pluralism were extended to public administration. Just as political parties were seen as 'aggregating' the claims of diverse interest groups, so government was seen as 'disaggregated' into numerous public agencies, each expressing a particular interest or viewpoint. This viewpoint might express the interests of a particular section of the public or related interest group, altematively or additionally it could be a vehicle for bureaucratic interests or ambitions. This pluralist universe was seen as moving, in Lindblom's phrase, through processes of 'disjointed incrementalism' (or 'muddling through') via piecemeal compromises negotiated between diverse political and bureaucratic protagonists. If some important public interest or section of society was seen as unrepresented then the favoured remedy (on this theory) was to set up another agency to speak for it -just as President F.D. Roosevelt had done in his New Deal administrative innovations (Truman, 1951 (1960) . Both studies (and many others) showed the influence of administrative agencies and in the latter case public sector unions in reaching negotiated policy outcomes. In European countries the influence of departmental interest or 'philosophy', while certainly pertinent, was modified by the control of polyvalent administrators -except in the home base of a strong cadre such as (often) the Ministry of Finance.
Another aspect of pluralism was the need for bureaucracy to adapt to social change. The theory of 'representative bureaucracy' argued that bureaucracy should reflect as closely as possible the social (and the ethnic) composition of the population. In Britain the Fulton Report (The Civil Service, 1968) was concemed with administrative efficiency but (as Lord Fulton later said) a prime consideration was to open up the administrative class to broader social recruitment -an attempt which largely failed because it did not break the dominance of 'Oxbridge' graduates among successful recruits or develop an effective enough ladder of advancement for junior civil servants. These outcomes were not the fault of the Fulton Committee, but stemmed from the conservatism of senior civil servants and their self-perpetuating image of a desirable public servant.
Simultaneously the precepts of scientific administration dissolved into a pluralist recognition of the tensions and conflicts inherent within a complex administrative structure. Scientific administration was first undermined by the motivational evidence of the human relations school and discovery of the relevance of informal networking and adaptation. In Administrative Behaviour (1945), Herbert Simon exploded the 'proverbs of administration' which he saw as impossible attempts to reconcile opposing administrative tendencies, such as the tensions between staff (overhead units) and line, specialists and generalists, functional fragmentation and central co-ordination. A pluralist approach recognised these tensions as unavoidable and looked for balancing points which could optimise a relevant set of administrative values. In Administrative Theories and Politics (1972), I developed this point to suggest that, as the whole system becomes more complex, a development in one direction is often followed by a compensating (if weaker) development in another; for example the growth of specialised field services is followed by an effort to re-establish the authority of a generalist field co-ordinator. At the top of the tree, however, constitutional arrangements may preclude even this limited solution; for example, F.D. Roosevelt was a skilful enough President to utilise effectively the staff resources placed at his disposal at the behest of his Committee on Administrative Management, but a modern American President -skilful or not -cannot effectively direct or co-ordinate the numerous staff personnel who act in his name. Constitutional theory defeats administrative efficiency.
Herbert Simon (1945) switched attention from theories of structure to theories of decision-making. This started a lively debate. Simon's own concept of rational decision-making was something of a red herring because it required administrators to examine the expected factual consequences of a wide range of altemative decisions and then to evaluate them. In practice administrators (and politicians) have to work within a context of assumed values and constraints which narrows their choice considerably, and the key question is when and if they should question their assumptions. Simon's wish to model 'administrative man' on 'economic man' sets up an idealised concept of cost-benefit analysis or comprehensive planning; but at least Simon was exploring problems posed by the widening range of public policy goals (described by Sir Geoffrey Vickers as the 'multi-valued choice') in a way that is no longer seen as relevant under the current cut-down concept of the tasks of public administration.
The subsequent debate tumed on the scope for breadth and originality in decision-making. Lindblom (1968) argued that disjointed incrementalism was not only inevitable (as a rule) in a pluralist society, but that it was preferable to reach agreed compromises ('partisan mutual adjustment') rather than attempt the very difficult or impossible goal of a comprehensive plan. Dror (1968) countered with the theory that decision-making should involve bold lateral thinking, which introduced emotional or non-rational as well as rational and quantifiable factors into the equation. To some extent these differences reflected one of habitat; Dror was concemed with the very special problems and constraints of policy-making in Israel, but he also argued the general value of high-level strategic think-tanks within govemment. Etzioni (1979) advocated a form of mixed scanning which would combine a broad contextual survey of possible and desirable developments with the realistic room for manoeuvre in a specific case. March and Simon (1959) stressed the very limited adaptability of organisations to new situations and problems. Against this pragmatism, it might be possible to rescue some degree of comprehensive planning, on grounds not of its superior intellectual quality but of its broader organisational leverage for reconciling divergent interests in a more satisfactory way (Self, 1974) . Sir Geoffrey Vickers (1965) Phenomenon (1964) . It also produced new insights, primarily American ones, into the culture of particular public agencies such as Kaufman's The Forest Ranger (1967) and into the relationship between a public agency and its political environment (Selznick's TVA and the Grass Roots, 1949) . The role of administrative leaders in upholding the distinctive values and purpose of their organisation was also developed in America by Chester Barnard (1964) and Selznick (1957) , and in England by Vickers (1973) .
The third period starts around 1975 and is now probably at its climax. It resembles the first period in having a strong ruling paradigm in place of the variety and experiment of the second period. There are two dominant notions. One is that political will should be asserted more closely and tightly over or against the bureaucracy. The second notion is that bureaucracy should be restructured according to market theories of efficiency and effectiveness. Together these ideas represent substantial change in the character and status of public bureaucracy, through removing some of its traditional sources of protection and seeking to 'normalise' its operations as similar in principle to those of other organisations, especially business firms.
There are three theoretical sources or rationalisations of the new adminis-trative orthodoxy. From a political standpoint, the public choice school sees bureaucracy as a set of self-interested individuals primarily pursuing their own private interests in money and status, not working collectively for some public interest (which is anyhow argued by some public choice theorists not to exist, except perhaps at a constitutional level, e.g. Buchanan, 1962) . Niskanen (1971) turned this assumption into a theory of the empire-building bureaucrat and Dunleavy (1991) switched it into a theory of the controlling bureaucrat who advances his own interest by cutting and reshaping administration under political instruction. There is an interesting difference here between the independent power of the bureaucrat in the first case and his dependent position in the second -no doubt reflecting the reassertion of political will under the new orthodoxy. Pluralist theories recognised the existence of selfish or ambitious interests within bureaucracy, but they were not thought wholly divorced from public interest considerations and they were predicated of group or organisational, not individual behaviour. Public choice theory is more relevant to American administration than to the more collective European style of administration, unless indeed the latter is broken up and individualised as some reformers intend (a process which has gone much further in Britain than elsewhere in Europe). The TV series Yes, Minister was a sort of public choice textbook but Sir Humphrey Appleby was keen on protecting the privileges of the British administrative class, not just himself (and the Minister was equally prone to self-interest).
The second theoretical source is economic beliefs in the necessity of reducing public expenditure, cutting public services and maximising the role and scope of the market system. These beliefs inevitably point to a slimmer bureaucracy. The third source is managerial theories which believe in introducing more competition and economic incentives into public administration and in establishing a more flexible, cost-conscious and decentralised style of management in public services.
Taken together these theories are used to justify the "new institutional economics" or "new public management" (Pollitt, 1990) . Its main features are tighter political control of senior appointments and more use of political advisers or extemal consultants instead of intemal specialists; less security of tenure and more external recruitment to key positions; more use of economic incentives and disciplines within bureaucracy; separation of policy-making from operational functions and competition with the private sector over service delivery; greater flexibility for public service managers over hiring and firing and over the use of strictly rationed resources; devolution of management of public services to the lowest practicable operational level; and an extensive use of contractual relations for the employment of senior officials and for relationships among public agencies and between public agencies and private firms or voluntary organisations.
Naturally the theoretical parentage of this raft of particular prescriptions is hard to determine and not always mutually consistent. The new institutional economics seems to have sprung up readymade. but I have done my best to suggest its theoretical origins or rationalisations. Again not all the prescriptions are necessarily pursued jointly or within equal vigour. There is a difference here between English-speaking countries, especially Britain, New Zealand and to some extent Australia, which have eagerly embraced many of these reforms, and continental European countries which have been less impressed by the new dogmas. The explanation may lie partly in the greater economic problems and stronger market liberalism of the first group and in the stronger, more constitutionally embedded status and prestige of the public service in European countries like France and Germany. The USA has witnessed the strongest attack on bureaucracy led by President Reagan, together with strong efforts to curtail or privatise Federal public services or transfer them to the states.
A Critique of Current Theories It will be helpful to explore the dominant theories of today further by placing them more closely in the context of the two earlier periods. The key issues to be covered remain political-bureaucratic relationships and the organisation of the administrative system. While the 'scientific management' theories of the first period drew an unrealistic line between politics and administration, the way that line was drawn had the effect of enshrining the 'merit principle' and helping to achieve reasonably impartial, uncorrupt and stable administration. Public administration was viewed as a worthy and distinctive career in its own right, as well as becoming gradually a worthwhile subject for academic study. However, as a consequence, bureaucracy did acquire some capacity to delay or modify unpalatable political directives and at its height could produce the claim (rarely stated but often latent) that it stood for the 'permanent' interests of the nation as opposed to the shorter duration of its political masters (Lord Harcourt's remark that the job of Ministers was to prevent bureaucrats from being hung by their coat-tails in Whitehall neatly complemented this viewpoint).
The development of administrative politics in the second period demolished this clear differentiation of roles and exposed sections of the bureaucracy to criticism. Pluralism might claim that the policy process as a whole was tolerably fair and well-balanced, but critics could argue that too much administrative power had been delegated to officials and that they and interest groups were locked in too cosy an embrace (Lowi, 1979 ). Lowi's theory of 'interest group liberalism' linked with the alleged 'overload' crisis of the 1970's, whereby the govemment apparatus was said to be clogged up with an excessive volume of demands and administrative attempts to meet them (Rose, 1980) . Guy Peters' The Politics of Bureaucracy (1978) analyses the state of bureaucracy in the 1970s. He notes that political and administrative culture was generally supportive of bureaucracy in westem democracies, although more ambivalent in the USA. He notes (p.88) that in many countries 'purposive' (goal achievement) or 'solidary' (collective ethos) motivations were as or sometimes more important than financial incentives -a point seemingly lost upon public choice critics. He concedes that with the expansion of govemment programmes, administrative agencies have acquired more power to set their own policy agenda, backed sometimes by connections with interest groups; on the other hand bureaucracy as a whole, rent by intemal divisions and keeping clear of macro-politics, was largely 'directionless' (France at least might be an exception here). He even suggests (p.235) that, with the rising demand for public goods associated with rising affluence, people may feel that "goods and services produced through the political process may be superior to those privately produced" and consequently "less questioning of the actual costs and benefits of public programs"! Peters' account, despite many reservations, represented a high watermark in the status of bureaucracy which was about to be sharply reversed. It may be doubted how far this reversal was the result of criticisms of bureaucracy (true or false) or of a claimed popular dissatisfaction with 'insensitive' administrative rules or methods. At any rate a more immediate factor was the sudden sharp decline in economic growth which, as Peters also pointed out (Rose and Peters, 1978) , cut take-home pay and led to pressure for lower taxation and less govemment. These pressures combined with the growth of global markets and the emergence of 'new right' govemments to undermine the position that bureaucracy had achieved through several decades of steady economic and still faster govemmental growth.
Consequently the ground was laid for the much more thoroughgoing and virulent attack upon bureaucrats and interest groups by public choice writers such as Olson (1982) and Buchanan (1986) . Political leaders were looked to to rescue govemment from these insidious influences, even though the public choice critique applied equally to the self-interest of politicians. Hence the right of political leaders to control bureaucracy was stated in much more absolute terms than in the earlier Woodrow Wilson construct. Drawing upon a variant of transaction-cost analysis (Williamson, 1975) , the principal-agent contractual model was applied to the relationship between a Minister and his chief official. It was argued that the Minister, in order to reduce the problems of 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' (meaning the ability of the agent to substitute his own personal interest for that of his principal), needs a free hand over selecting the official; and to ensure that his wishes are followed through, the Minister needs to set objectives backed by suitable incentives and penalties (a short appointment).
This theory offers a very one-eyed view of relationships within govemment. It seems to exclude the responsibility of bureaucrats to Parliament and public for fair administration. It is concemed exclusively with the behaviour of the agent, which might be appropriate where the agent is providing only a limited personal service for a fee, but in more complex relationships (such as the political-administrative borderline) it is the 'principal' who may have the greater opportunity to exploit his control of the 'agent' for partisan or personal ends (Perrow, 1986) . Following through the theory one could argue that the Minister is also the agent of parliament or its majority (and ultimately the electorate) and should be closely controlled by them. In fact the principal-agent theory cannot cope with institutional relationships which have a reciprocal or balanced character.
Nonetheless this theory has been used to justify administrative changes such as stronger political control of appointments, backed by short-term contracts and personal financial incentives. These innovations may shake up collective inertia and conservatism within bureaucracy, but they also undermine collective traditions of teamwork and public service ethics and the preservation of institutional memory. It is doubtful whether bureaucracy can work effectively or fairly without keeping these traditions.
As in the first period, but unlike the second one, the new theories attempt to draw a line between policy and administration or now, management. The building blocks are devolved units of accountable management (budget centres) or, as in Britain, hived-off agencies. Their tasks are set by a charter or contract, they are guided by politically set or influenced targets, but they are accorded managerial autonomy over the effective matching of demands and resources, including a variable capacity to increase revenue by user charges and to reduce costs by outside contracting or changes in staffing. Moreover each such unit is seen as relatively self-contained with limited accountability to a parent department and only contractual obligations to other agencies.
This managerial model of 'lean administration' exhibits in extreme from the pursuit of one administrative value at the expense of another. The conflicts within administrative structure pointed to by earlier writers like Simon will not go away. Here managerial effectiveness is being pursued at much loss to political accountability which is clearly weakened where a public service is hived off to a separate agency under a contractual relation, and weakened still further when that agency is also encouraged or chooses to sub-contract services to a private firm (See Greer, 1994) . The line of accountability to parliament becomes frayed indeed and is unlikely to be mended by a 'citizens' charter'.
Once again such managerial and legal autonomy as the devolved agency is allowed, is gained at the expense of policy co-ordination. This may not seem to matter to politicians who do not believe in 'planning', but it undermines attempts to reconcile competing policy objectives or to mount a concerted attack upon some perceived social problem. Informal co-operation between agencies is also much handicapped by their contractual relations and the pressure on each agency to economise. Hence there is greater vulnerability to natural or social disasters and administrative breakdowns (Hood, 1991) .
The new institutional economics accepts (in theory) that equity and impartiality are distinctive values of public administration which should be preserved; but they again become subsidiary values, ranking below the pressure for economy and 'goal achievement'. Moreover these values are also threatened by the reduced security and capacity for self-management of the bureaucracy.
They are likely to seem less pertinent to external recruits, while increased political intervention over appointments and rewards does reopen the dangers of political favouritism or informal pressure.
'Scientific administration' saw the same general principles applicable to all large organisations, of which public administration was an important case with certain special features. The pluralist theorists brought out many distinctive features of public administration and generally accepted that its processes complemented and paralleled those of the market economy. However the new theorists as noted earlier cast a jaundiced eye upon public administration as distribution.
intrinsically inferior to the outcome of market forces which they take as their benchmark. Hence the arguments for slimming and remodelling the administrative system along alleged market lines and for turning public administration in effect into a junior branch of business administration.
In Government by the Market? (1993) I contend that this application of a market model to public administration is seriously flawed. The tasks of public administration remain in critical respects different from any business organisation. They draw on powers of coercion and taxation which have no market parallel. Equally they entail corresponding obligations of 'due process', equity and responsiveness which also have no parallel. Despite the rhetoric, the clients of public administration are not and cannot be 'consumers' in the market sense save in some public enterprises. Some are criminal offenders who need to be controlled and reformed. Many others are either possible targets or beneficiaries of statutory regulations which only government can make and enforce. Many core social services cannot be allocated simply according to the demands of clients (although their wishes should be considered), but must take account of their needs and capacities. Some assumptions behind new administrative theories are false.
An uncritical view of the market system (which is also wrongly supposed to accord with economic theory) also leads the dominant public choice school into errors about interest groups and bureaucrats. Interest groups are not just, as they claim, 'rent-seekers' at the public expense, but often represent causes or claims about equity which are pushed aside in the market process. Bureaucrats can be (and need to be) motivated by collegial public service traditions, not just a narrow self-interest. Because of the different tasks and conditions of bureaucracy, the introduction of market-style tests of incentives, competition and rapid turnover can produce perverse results.
New Ideas About Governance In conclusion we will look briefly at some new theories which centre on the concept of 'governance'. These theories shift attention away from the politicalbureaucratic relationship to a concern with the mobilisation of institutional resources in society in order to pursue public policy goals. They thus switch from a hierarchical or command made of government action to a co-operative or partnership mode and from centralised control to decentralised initiatives. Two different approaches to this theme may be sketched, one turning on a limited form of 'strategic planning' at the centre, the other upon spontaneous, ad hoc solutions to policy problems largely at the periphery.
The first approach, exemplified in Modern Governance: New GovernmentSociety Interactions (edited by Jan Kooiman, 1993) argues that government must be revamped to match the variety, complexity and dynamism of modern societies. Neither traditional bureaucracy nor fashionable market-based reform packages are equal to this task. A better course is the maximum devolution of powers to largely self-regulating institutions or public-private partnerships, coupled with the creation of a new science (or art?) of governance viewed as the strategic design and motivation of complex inter-organisational networks. Some co-ordinated planning at the centre will help to design and steer the operation of largely autonomous decentralised institutions.
The second approach, exemplified by Osborne and Gaebler's Reinventing Government (1992) , envisages decentralised public agencies co-operating with business, community and voluntary groups to improve public service delivery and meet new or urgent social demands. The stress is upon developing a culture of local initiative and problem-solving by entrepreneurial officials in partnership with other local actors and stakeholders. Thus it requires a drastic reduction of bureaucratic controls -an approach recently exemplified in the proposal of the Gore Commission that U.S. federal agencies should be free to redesign their work and their methods from the bottom up.
These two theories clearly reflect their cultural origins. Modern Governance is largely a Dutch production which reflects the degree of consensus in Dutch society and the accumulated respect for a public service which has always been active in social and indeed physical engineering. The concept of a rather vague and potentially weak 'strategic planning' from the centre carries more credibility in this national context. Reinventing Government, on the other hand, reflects an American distrust of 'big government' and an acceptance of the micro-economic assumption that greater efficiency (in this context better problem-solving) at the level of piecemeal or local initiatives will somehow solve the problems of society as a whole. The broader 'macro' approach to policy making and implementation tends to be marginalised or perhaps put in the 'too hard' basket.
However an implication of both theories is to restore, by the back door, the importance of bureaucracy. It is surely impossible to imagine the very difficult tasks assigned to 'strategic planning' by Kooiman and others being adequately tackled by any but exceptionally able and intelligent people. Much traditional writing on bureaucracy (such as March and Simon) would suggest that the tasks involved are impossible unless reduced to more limited programmes or perhaps exercised arbitrarily; but in any case those doing this work, however recruited, would need to have a highly respected status as policy advisers and coordinators. Equally, although differently, the kind of 'policy entrepreneurship' favoured by Osborne and Gaebler requires public officials with a high degree of initiative, competence and independence.
Reverting to the earlier history, the scientific administrators advocated a strong measure of control and co-ordination exercised across the administrative system from the top down. The pluralist thinkers were concerned with middle level interchanges between administrative agencies and groups (internal and external). The latest theorising locates effective action at the lowest level of operations or in public-private partnerships. These last ideas could be seen as a somewhat desperate attempt to re-establish the legitimacy of government without confronting directly its downgrading in the interest of 'liberating' global markets.
It is sometimes said that the 'Service State' is going to be replaced by the 'Regulatory State'. Despite market deregulation, there are many new pressures distribution.
for public regulation, including urgent environmental issues, the consequences of privatisation, anxiety about technological change (drugs, genetic engineering etc.) and financial abuses. It seems very doubtful that effective regulation of these matters can be achieved through a weakened bureaucracy working through forms of 'light regulation' or self-regulation by interested parties. A weak bureaucracy could also be undercut by politicians intervening on behalf of particular interests or themselves. Officials in a weak bureaucracy could be caught between the possibly erratic directives of Ministers and the subtle temptations coming from strong interests being regulated. A modestly paid bureaucrat, uncertain of political support, is weakly placed to enforce standards upon a multi-national company. Therefore an effective govemment will require of its bureaucrats much skill in the detailed design of regulatory systems (including the use of controls and incentives) and a strongly independent and impartial stance over their application and enforcement. The altemative will be a further slide into social disorder and the charms of 'anarcho-capitalism'.
Hence it may be premature to announce the death of traditional bureaucracy. Doubtless the style of bureaucracy will continue to change; there will be less hierarchy, more flexibility and more delegation to operational units than in the past. There will be changes of fashion as the inevitable dilemmas or conflicts of administrative systems continue to be played out. But some of the features of modem bureaucracy as it came into existence a century or so ago remain as or more essential to good government today. These include the possession of enough skills, status and independence to offer useful advice about the implementation of distinctive public purposes and to apply those purposes impartially and fearlessly. All political actors (including senior bureaucrats) are liable to abuse their position through self-interest; but the public choice theorists, who stated and exaggerated this tendency, have pointed the finger too much at bureaucrats rather than at politicians or the powerful interests who influence them. Good govemment depends at a minimum upon a balance between different roles (politicians, bureaucrats, business etc.), not their fusion into a single, unaccountable 'power elite'; or, as Eva Etzioni-Halevy (1983) puts it, democracy (still) needs bureaucracy.
